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My claim is that Durkheim‘s sociology is driven on the philosophy of 
consciousness. To make my point I will start by stressing the importance of 
the concept of representation in his work. Then I will show that this 
conception relies on Durkheim‘s interpretation of Kant. With that aim I will 
depict Durkheim‘s position on representation as an expression of the 
philosophy of consciousness, following Husserl and Henry. In addition I will 
argue that representations are thought by Durkheim as a product of the main 
function of our consciousness which is to constitute syntheses. I will end by 
suggesting that Renouviers‘s distinction of inner and outer sense informed 
the way Durkheim conceived of individual and social representations as two 
different functions of our consciousness, one that we use to make our own 
representations of the objects of our thought, another that we use to 
represent to ourselves objects external to us. 
 




1. Three major misunderstandings concerning 
Durkheim’s sociology 
Durkheim‘s sociology has being misunderstood from the 
outset as one can see in his own complaints about the way his 
Rules… were read in his time. One of these major 
misinterpretations involves Durkheim‘s concept of 
representations. In the Preface to the second edition of Rules… 
he complained that his critics did not realize how important 
representations are for understanding social life.1 Another major 
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misunderstanding concerns the exteriority of social facts, that 
has been confused with the idea —which Durkheim explicitly 
rejects— of the exteriority of social phenomena as regards the 
individuals.2 A third misinterpretation is related to the notion of 
objectivity, which Durkheim called his ―fundamental principle,‖ 
that was not unanimously accepted in his days.3 
These three misunderstandings are parts of one and the 
same confusion which requires one integrated approach. 
Specifically, the first misunderstanding is at the base of the 
other two since disregarding the role of representations heads to 
a misleading conception of the exteriority and the objectivity of 
social facts. A deeper comprehension of what Durkheim meant 
by ―representation‖ is then needed in order to grasp what he had 
in mind whilst claiming that social facts are external to the 
individuals and that they have an objectivity of their own. 
To fully understand Durkheim‘s notion of representations 
we must take into account that they are a product of the activity 
of our consciousness. Maybe one of the reasons why ―Durkheim 
is one of the best known and one of the least understood major 
social thinkers‖ (LaCapra 2001, 3) is that not many of his 
readers have realized of the importance of the concept of 
representation and the consequences it has for main  issues  of 
his sociology.  
In order to deal with this subject, I will start by stressing 
the importance of the concept of representation in Durkheim. 
Then I will show that this conception relies on post Kantian 
ideas that he received from the French philosopher Renouvier. 
Then I will depict Durkheim‘s position on representation as an 
expression of the philosophy of consciousness following Husserl. 
In addition I will argue that representations are thought by 
Durkheim as a product of the main function of our consciousness 
which is to constitute syntheses. I will conclude with a discussion 
about the meaning of Kantism for Durkheim‘s sociology drawn 
upon Henry‘s critique of dualism. 
 
2. Representations, a key concept in Durkheim 
Representation is a key concept in Durkheim. For 
instance, nothing less than the collective is made of 





representations and consists ―entirely‖ in representations 
(Stedman Jones 2003, 70).  
Despite its relevance, not all scholars have noticed the 
centrality of representations for the sociology of Durkheim. In 
this regard, three different stances have been taken. Some 
(probably the most) have overlooked the importance of 
representations in Durkheim. Others, such as Lukes, upheld 
that ―representation is a post-1895 concept.‖ (Stedman Jones 
2003, 14) A few (and I would like to include myself in this group) 
consider that ―representation‖ is a core concept for Durkheim 
since his early writings and is a fundamental reference in order 
to truly understand his oeuvre (Stedman Jones 2003, 16-18).  
My claim here is not that Durkheim often mentioned the 
word ―representation‖ in his early writings but that his 
longstanding idea that social facts are objective and external to 
the individuals only makes sense if related to the idea of 
representation4 conceived, in Kantian terms, as the opposition 
between internal and external reality. Maybe this is why the 
neglect of representations in Durkheim often goes along with 
the oblivion of the ubiquitous notion of consciousness, since ―it 
is the functions of conscience which make representation 
possible.‖ (Stedman Jones 2003, 18) 
 
3. Durkheim’s sociology as “an extension of 
Kantianism” 
Despite the fact that some scholars choose to focus con 
Durkheim‘s ambivalent relation to Kant (see Vera 2002, 112; 
see also Murguía Lores 2002, 89, 91) or even in his criticism 
(see Morales Zúñiga 2009, 158, 151; Giner 2008, 12-13), it 
would not be difficult to attest Kant‘s influence on Durkheim. 
For instance, one could argue that he vaguely echoes kantian 
language when opposing sensations and sensibility to concepts5 
and when advocating for the human personality6. But that 
won‘t be necessary since I‘m not the first to notice the influence 
of Kantism on Durkheim. Major social theoricists like Giddens 
have reffered to ―Durkheim‘s sociological Kantism,‖ (Giddens 
1979, 22) and allusions to this topic are ubiquitous in the state 
of the art. For instance, LaCapra considers Durkheim‘s 
―passion for dualistic antinomies‖ as a neo-Kantian influence, 
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along with the ―philosophy of finitude‖ and the understanding 
of morality as a matter of practical reason (LaCapra 2001, 6).  
Also Stedman Jones observes the influence of neo-Kantism on 
Durkheim, this time, attributed to Renouvier, who ―was the 
first French philosopher to point to the scientific importance of 
Kant‘s Copernican revolution.‖ (Stedman Jones 2003, 17) And 
Boudon goes further yet by arguing that Durkheim erected his 
sociology as ―an extension of Kantianism.‖ (Boudon 2006, 140)  
However, I won‘t address here such a large subject as 
―Durkheim and Kantism.‖ I will focus on one aspect of Kantism 
which is essential to understand what Durkheim had in mind 
when speaking of consciousness. This particular aspect is the 
idea of representation. Also, I will focus not on Kant himself but 
in the way his ideas were received by Durkheim, on how 
Renouvier influenced him, and on how they antedated 
phenomenology since they involve the idea of consciousness as 
intentionality (in a Husserlian sense) and as the opposition of 
the object and the subject (in Herny‘s terms). 
 
4. Core issues of the metaphysics of representation 
in Durkheim’s sociology 
Durkheim thought that representations are inner 
determinations of the subject but he also considered the 
collective aspect of representations, which he pursued ―through 
the logic of ‗external‘ relations.‖ (Stedman Jones 2003, 17)  As 
Stedman Jones notes, he appreciated that Kant had shown 
―that representation is not a private subjective (or merely 
‗inner‘) experience but has an objective reality that is general‖ 
(ibid.); and this ideas came to Durkheim through Renouvier, 
who –in a peculiar, personal way— 
continued Kant‘s distinction between the inner and the outer aspect 
as a way of accounting for all aspects of experience7 within the logic 
of representation. For Renouvier the self logically belongs to the 
inner aspect of representation: nature and material things or all 
external relations belong to the outer aspect – or external relation; 8 
all external relations – that is all relations other than the self are 
logically outside9. So Durkheim stresses external reality (le dehors) 
whilst insisting that all is representation, for society consists in the 
relations which surround the person and which are thus logically 





external. This analysis helps to explain Durkheim‘s use of the outside 
(le dehors) in relation to social facts (Stedman Jones 2003, 18). 
Durkheim also conceived of collective consciousness as 
opposite to individual consciousness inasmuch as the exterior 
opposes the interior.10 That‘s why –he argues— individual and 
social states of consciousness are heterogeneous (Durkheim 
2005, 360). The opposition between internal and external 
reality and the idea that the social is objective —therefore, 
external— can be clearly appreciated, for instance, in the large 
issue of the origin and nature of categories, which increasingly 
interested Durkheim along the years. 
 
5. Categories and the oppositional structure of 
consciousness 
Durkheim held that categories are both, objective and 
external.  He considered them as ruled by objective laws of 
representations constituted in the sphere of the outer (Stedman 
Jones 2003, 17)11. By doing this, he was answering the French 
spiritualists, who ―had developed a tradition of deriving the 
categories from internal reflection.‖ (Schmaus 2004, 100) 
Durkheim, instead, considered that even inner experiences that 
generate in part some fundamental categories (such as the 
category of causality) are inner experiences of outer social forces 
―generated in us by collective representations.‖ (Schmaus 2004) 
Representations are a function of consciousness (Stedman 
Jones 2007, 99); therefore, consciousness has a ―centrality‖ with 
regards to representations (Stedman Jones 2003, 16-17). Despite 
this centrality, the concept of consciousness is ―the most 
neglected theoretical term in Durkheim‘s thought.‖ (Stedman 
Jones 2007, 98) By ―centrality‖, I mean that the concept of 
consciousness is ―closely tied‖ in with Durkheim‘s fundamental 
concepts, ―primarily amongst which is solidarity.‖ (Stedman 
Jones 2007, 95) Indeed,  
it is the similarity of consciences that gives birth to legal rules and 
that constitutes traditional mechanical solidarity. Thus conscience is 
central to the whole issue of solidarity. In the traditional mechanical 
case, social cohesion results from a ‗conformity of all particular 
consciences to a common type, which is nothing but the psychic type 
of society‘. [… And] the concept of conscience is also present in the 
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concept of a modern organic solidarity. […] Organic solidarity is 
about differentiation, and this entails a sphere of action, within 
conscience, which is free from the conscience commune and which is 
where ‗special functions develop‘. (ibid.) 
Since it is related to Durkheim‘s main ideas, to clarify 
what he meant by consciousness is a condition sine qua non for 
understanding the deepest meaning of his sociology, no matter 
if some scholars forget or choose to ignore that Durkheim is 
insistently talking about it. 
The first thing to notice is that, for Durkheim, 
representations involve ―both the mode of thinking and that 
which is thought.‖ (Stedman Jones, 2003, 18 ; see also Paoletti 
2002, 444)12 This is what Husserl called intentionality: the 
correlation of the cogito and the cogitatum13. However, 
Durkheim didn‘t get this from Husserl but from Renouvier, who 
upheld an idealistic, anti-realistic, reinterpretation of Kant 
which rejected the ―thing-in-itself‖ and reduced it to the 
phenomenon14. Within his ―logic of representation‖, there were 
only two poles: 
the ‗representative‘ (représentatif) is that which represents and the 
‗represented‘ (representé) is what is represented or is referred to […]. 
Conscience covers the totality of these functions which do the 
referring and ‗thing‘ is that which is referred to. (The association of 
thing and the represented for Durkheim is clear). (Stedman Jones 
2003, 18. See Renouvier 1854, 24-25 ; 1901, 236-237)15 
So, representations are for Durkheim not just a 
subjective or merely cultural kind of thoughts—as Alexander 
seems to imply when claiming that there is a ―cultural turn‖ in 
The Elementary Forms of Religious Life16—. On the contrary, 
representations are twofold realities, objective as well as 
subjective, which are referred to one another. Put otherwise, 
representations are intentional. 
 
6. Synthesis, intersubjectivity and the social 
Durkheim‘s notion of consciousness not only involves 
intentionality but also what Husserl (Husserl 1982, 39, § 17) 
called ―the primal form belonging to consciousness‖, i.e., 
synthesis. However, Durkheim uses this term in a peculiar way 
since he focuses on synthesis constituted on the outer, not on 





the inner experience.17 In turn, this distinction runs parallel to 
the distinction of the social and the individual. 
Actually, ―we find Durkheim talking of the personal 
nature of our ‗conscience,‘ which ‗represents‘ and indeed 
‗constitutes‘ ‗notre personnalité individuelle‘.‖ (Stedman Jones 
2007, 80)18 Therefore, Durkheim acknowledges that there is ―a 
personal aspect of consciousness that is central to any social 
world‖ and, consequently, to his ―theoretical apparatus.‖ 
(Stedman Jones 2009, 693) One can find this line of argument, 
for instance, in Sociologie et philosophie, where Durkheim 
claims that collective consciousness emerges from a synthesis 
originating in the relations among individual consciousnesses. 
It rises as a social world produced by the reification of 
individual life outside itself. In this way, collective 
consciousness emerges from the intensification of interactions 
between individual consciousnesses. See, for instance, the 
following paragraph. 
Quand les consciences individuelles, au lieu de rester séparées les 
unes des autres, entrent étroitement en rapports, agissent 
activement les unes sur les autres, il se dégage de leur synthèse une 
vie psychique d‘un genre nouveau. Elle se distingue d‘abord, de celle 
que mène l‘individu solitaire, par sa particulière intensité. Les 
sentiments qui naissent et se développent au sein des groupes ont 
une énergie à laquelle n‘atteignent pas les sentiments purement 
individuels. L‘homme qui les éprouve a l‘impression qu‘il est dominé 
par des forces qu‘il ne reconnaît pas comme siennes, qui le mènent, 
dont il n‘est pas le maître, et tout le milieu dans lequel il est plongé 
lui semble sillonné par des forces du même genre. Il se sent comme 
transporté dans un monde différent de celui où s‘écoule son existence 
privée. La vie n‘y est pas seulement intense ; elle est qualitativement 
différente. Entraîné par la collectivité, l‘individu se désintéresse de lui-
même, s‘oublie, se donne tout entier aux fins communes. Le pôle de son 
conduit est déplacé et reporté hors de lui. (Durkheim 2004b, 133) 
As seen, Durkheim understands the synthesis from 
which the states of collective consciousness emerge as 
elaborated from the relationship between individual states of 
consciousness.19 In this view, a synthesis that brings together a 
multiplicity of individual states generates a new type of psychic 
life which, as such, is a feeling but a feeling distinct from the 
mere sum of individual feelings and which constitutes a new 
force arising from intersubjective effervescence. It is the 
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emergent character of this new order —new or different in 
relation to individual experience— that produces the feeling of 
exteriority and transcendence that awakens in us the social. 
Commenting Durkheim‘s position on this matter, 
Stedman Jones claims that ―the irreducibility of collective 
representations to individual representations‖ is based on ―the 
combination of ‗associated individuals‘ which establishes the 
diverse relations from which the collective representations 
develop.‖ (Stedman Jones 2003, 16) Accordingly, the alleged 
―synthesis at the level of the whole‖ (Stedman Jones 2003, 16-
17) might be thought of as nothing else than a combination sui 
generis of individual consciousnesses, i.e., as a ―communion‖ 
(Stedman Jones 2007, 97) or ―meeting of consciousnesses.‖20  
 
7. The social as an ontological region 
So far, Durkheim‘s argument seems indisputable. 
However, we still have to deal with what might be one of his 
most perplexing ideas. How can a synthesis be operated outside 
the individuals‘ consciousness? Does this mean that there is 
such a thing as a collective consciousness apart from it? Well, 
that‘s how many of Durkheim‘s advocates and even many of his 
detractors interpreted this.  But it‘s not what Durkheim 
though, as seen when discussing some misunderstandings 
concerning his sociology. He rejected the idea that social 
phenomena are external to individuals (Durkheim 1999, xv). 
So, there must be a better way to interpret the objective nature 
of social representations and their peculiar exteriority. 
Once again I‘ll have to agree with Stedman Jones: Social 
syntheses are constituted in ―one of the functions of conscience,‖ 
which is ―to relate.‖ (Stedman Jones 2007, 98) And this is how 
Durkheim expressed this idea in De la division du travail social. 
Il y a en nous deux consciences : l‘une ne contienne que des états qui 
son personnels à chacun de nous et qui nous caractérisent, tandis que 
les états que comprend l‘autre sont communs a toute la société. La 
première ne représente que notre personnalité individuelle et la 
constitue ; la seconde représente le type collectif et, par conséquent, la 
société sans laquelle il n‘existerait pas. Quand c‘est un des éléments de 
cette dernière qui détermine notre conduit, ce n‘est pas en vue de notre 
intérêt personnel que nous agissons, mais nous poursuivons des fins 
collectives. Or, quoique distinctes, ces deux consciences sont liées l‘une 





à l‘autre, puisqu‘en somme elles n’en font qu’une, n‘ayant pour elles 
deux qu‘un seul et même substrat organique. Elles sont donc 
solidaires. (Durkheim 2004a, 74; emphasis mine) 
Hence, even if there is a radical heterogeneity between 
personal and social consciousness and they fulfill different 
functions (one constitutes our social personality and the other 
represents the collective type), they both form a single 
consciousness with one single organic substrate. That is to say 
that the collective consciousness does not have an entity of its 
own and that its exteriority is such with respect to the 
ontological region21 of the individual personality and not with 
respect to the individual understood as an organism. Our two 
consciousnesses are then distinguished as two states of mind 
and not as two substances: they are distinct states of a single 
consciousness, structured into regions which have one single 
organic substratum. 
So the social is a state of consciousness that constitutes 
a specific ontological region and not a self-subsisting entity that 
oppresses individuals as a self-sufficient collective substance 
capable of operating on its own. The social exists in us: it is us, 
not in what we have of singular and incomparable but in what 
we have in common, in what we resemble and that which moves 
in us a feeling of belonging that could not drag us like a 
whirlwind outside we (using Durkheim‘s metaphor) if it did not 
move us from within; that is, if it were not immanent to us. 
 
8. Durkheim’s sociology as a philosophy of 
consciousness (final remarks) 
In my paper I have shown that the current state of the 
art mostly agrees that, in Durkheim‘s work, representativeness 
is the condition for everything that exists as a social fact. I have 
quoted different scholars who claimed that the concept of 
representation is one of Durkheim‘s main ideas and a 
persistent interest throughout his oeuvre. 
I have also shown that there is a consensus as regards 
the idea that for Durkheim representations are associated to 
objective experience. In particular, when it comes to social 
representations, its mere existence indicates the existence of an 
objective social fact. Thus, collective representations are 
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inextricably related to objectivity. In addition, I have depicted 
how representations and consciousness are closely tied in 
Durkheim since social, objective representations are opposed to 
individual, subjective representations —a demarcation drawn 
upon Renouvier‘s interpretation of the Kantian distinction of 
inner and outer experience.  
Finally, I suggested that Renouvier‘s distinction of 
inner sense and outer sense informed, at least in part, the way 
Durkheim conceived of individual and social representations. 
This is enlightening because it could lead to a non objectivistic 
understanding of Durkheim‘s sociology, if the distinction of 
individual and collective representations is no to be found in 
an hypostasized collective consciousness existing on its own 
but in two different functions of our consciousness, one that 
we use to make our own representations of the objects of our 
thought, another that we use to represent to ourselves objects 
external to us. 
Along the years, Durkheim dwelt in different ways with 
the issues and misunderstandings discussed here. This is one of 
the reasons why, as I said, his notion of representation is the 
most neglected theoretical term in his work. Nonetheless it is 
interesting to note how, regardless any other differences, the 
various stances on the subject remain faithful to this one idea: 
that representations have to do with the oppositional structure 
of consciousness. In this view, Durkheim‘s conception of 
representation must be considered a philosophy of 
consciousness in the terms outlined by Henry in his critique of 
ontological monism.22 
According to Henry, for the philosophy of consciousness 
all that exists has as its condition that we may represent it. 
Consequently, to be known and to be a phenomenon means to 
become represented. Also, to be known means to be an object: to 
be an object is to be represented and to be represented is to be 
known as an object. Consequently, representativeness is the 
essence common to knowledge and objectivity (Henry 1985, 
125). Furthermore, for being an ontology of our experience of 
objects, Henry considers the metaphysics of representation as a 
philosophy of consciousness since it conceives of experience as 
the subject‘s relation to the object. (Henry 1985, 7) 





In conclusion, I intended to demonstrate that the main 
features of the metaphysics of representation outlined by Henry 
–namely, objectivity, exteriority and the oppositional structure 
of consciousness— can be found in Durkheim‘s work.23 In this 
perspective, Durkheim shall be seen as a post Kantian who 
antedated Phenomenology for good and for worse; i.e., as and 
early sketch of what Husserl called ―the Principle of 
All Principles‖ (that is, intentionality) and, at the same time, as 






1 « Alors que nous avions dit expressément et répété de toutes les manières 
que la vie sociale était tout entière faite de représentations, on nous accusa 
d‘éliminer l‘élément mental de la sociologie » (Durkheim 1999, XI). 
2 « Une autre proposition n‘a été passée moins vivement discutée que la 
précédent : c‘est celle qui présente les phénomènes sociaux comme extérieurs 
aux individus » (Durkheim 1999, XV). 
3 « D‘ailleurs, ces contestations sont très souvent venues de ce que l‘on se 
refusait à admettre, ou de ce que l‘on n‘admettait pas sans réserves, notre 
principe fondamental : la réalité objective des faits sociaux. C‘est donc 
finalement sur ce principe que tout repose, et tout y ramène » (Durkheim 
1999, XXIII). 
4 Is not the word but the meaning what can be found in Durkheim‘s early 
works. 
5 Indeed, while reffering to les civilisations primitives, he claims: «  il faut en 
chercher les causes déterminantes dans des sensations et des mouvements de 
la sensibilité, non dans des concepts » (Durkheim 2004a, 275). 
6 « Voilà pourquoi, suivant la formule kantienne, nous devons respecter la 
personnalité humaine partout où elle se rencontre, c‘est-à-dire chez nous 
comme chez nos semblables » (Durhheim 2004a, 395). 
7 Indeed, Kant argues that ―for an experience in general to be possible, the 
reality of outer sense is necessarily bound up with that of inner sense, i.e., I 
am just as certainly conscious that there are things outside me to which my 
sensibility relates, as I am conscious that I myself exist determined in time.‖ 
(Kant 1998, 122) 
8 « Nous appellerons subjective toute qualité constitutive d‘un sujet 
quelconque, ou qui appartient à sa nature définie ; et objective, tout 
représentation, en tant que donnée à une conscience comme son objet, externe 
ou interne qu‘on le suppose. […] toute sensation externe est objective, en tant 
que représentative ; subjective, en tant que propriété du sujet doué de 
sensibilité » (Renouvier 1901, 7). 
9 In this, Renouvier is actually following Kant closely, when he states that: 
―By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we represent to ourselves 
objects as outside us, and all as in space. […] Inner sense, by means of which 
 




the mind intuits itself, or its inner state, gives, to be sure, no intuition of the 
soul itself, as an object, yet it is still a determinate form, under which the 
intuition of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything that belongs to 
the inner determinations is represented in relations of time. Time can no 
more be intuited externally than space can be intuited as something in us.‖ 
(Kant 1998, 157, 174) 
10 In this view, exteriority is immediately given while interiority is harder to 
reach: « Nous partons du dehors parce qu‘il est seul immédiatement donné, 
mais c‘est pour atteindre le dedans » (Durkheim 2005, 356 n1). 
11 In the following I will heavily rely on Stedman Jones‘ interpretation of 
Durkheim and the influence of Renouvier‘s neo Kantism on his concept of 
exteriority.  
12 « Chaque représentation a, pour Durkheim, un caractère  intentionnel – 
c‘est-à-dire qu‘elle est représentation ‗de quelque chose ‘ » (Paoletti 2002, 438). 
13 According to Husserl, the word ―intentionality‖ refers to ―this universal 
fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something; as a 
cogito, to bear within itself its cogitatum.‖ (Husserl 1982, 33) Inasmuch 
Durkheim is dealing with the correlation of the subjective and the objective –
for instance, with the distinction of individual and collective representations 
(Durkheim 2004b)— it can be said that he takes intentionality for granted. 
14 See Renouvier 1901, 53-54. In this regard, Paoletti notes: « Renouvier 
finissait par défendre vraiment la position anti-réaliste selon laquelle il n‘y 
aurait aucune réalité indépendante de nos représentations. [...] Avec la 
distinction entre la réceptivité des formes de l‘intuition sensible (espace et 
temps) et la spontanéité des catégories de l‘esprit, la différence entre ce qui est 
connaissable – l‘objet d‘expérience, le phénomène selon Kant – et ce qui n‘es pas 
connaissable, mais seulement pensable comme étant existant – le ‗noumène‘ – 
est également annulée » (Paoletti 2002, 441 ; cf. Kant 1998, 160, 162, 177). 
15 For Renouvier things are representations, representations are things, and 
both are ultimately phenomena: « Les choses en tant que représentations, 
conformément à ce que je viens d‘exposer, je les nomme des faits ou des 
phénomènes. Ainsi j‘arrive à définir la chose par la représentation après avoir 
défini la représentation par la chose; et ce cercle est inévitable; et les deux 
mots représentation et chose, d‘abord distingués, viennent se confondre en un 
troisième: phénomène » (Renouvier 1901, 7). 
16 Boudon‘s critique (2006, 138-139) is addressed to Alexander (2005 136-159). 
See also Affergan (2008, 147), who argues that there is not a ―conversion‖ 
between Rules… and The elementary forms… but ―a continuity with its 
curves, inflections and crevices, not being possible to speak of a rupture.‖ 
17 For instance, in Rules… he refers to collective syntheses constituted 
―outside of us‖ (Durkheim 1999, XX, n1). 
18 In this view, ―each person‘s conscience is to some extent freed [… from] the 
social milieu.‖ (Stedman Jones 2007, 96) 
19 Commenting on this, Watier (2008, 110) stresses that it is by penetrating, 
merging, mingling with each other, that consicences create a new entity, a 
collective consciousness. See also Vera (2002, 107). 
20 Weiss 2012, 90. Again, this kind of ideas seems to come from the Renouvier, 
who ―argued that for representation to be possible there must be more than 
 






one person who represents: representation is general and objective and as 
such is the condition of truth relations.‖ (Stedman Jones 2003, 17). 
21 I borrow the concept of ―ontological region‖ from Husserl´s Ideas I, §§ 2, 9 
&16. A region is delimited by the ―highest eidetic universalities.‖ (Husserl 
1983, 8; Husserl‘s emphasis) It is the highest genus to which the objects of a 
particular kind belong. (Husserl 1983, 18) In other words: ―A region is nothing 
other than the total highest generic unity belonging to a conretum, i.e., the 
essentially unitary nexus of the summa genera pertaining to the infimae 
species within the concretum. The eidetic extension of the region comprises 
the ideal totality of concretely unified complexes of infimae species belonging 
to these genera; the individual extension comprises the ideal totality of 
possible individua having such concrete essences. […] Each regional essence 
determines ‘synthetical’ eidetic truths, that is to say, truths that are grounded 
in it as this generic essence, but that are not mere particularizations of truths 
included in formal ontology.‖ (Husserl 1983, 31; Husserl‘s emphasis) 
22 Indeed, for Henry the concept of representation is related to ontological monism 
—the philosophical perspective that takes representation as the only way of being 
or appearing, thus falling into oblivion of Life (Henry 1985, 125-157). 
23 One can even conjecture that Henry might accept this since he implicitly 
assumes that there is a collective consciousness when he says: « C‘est 
précisément lorsque le concept chrétien de la Vérité cessera de déterminer la 
conscience collective de la société comme il le faisait au Moyen Age que son 
divorce d´avec l‘idée grecque d‘une connaissance et d‘une science véritable se 
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